Distributorship Negotiation with Grande Trade (GT)
Unlike
agency agreement with Zeller, by appointing GT as a distributor in
Germany, IUJ ill have more benefits and fewer liabilities. For example,
GT will take all risks in distributing products; IUJ needs to enter
only in sales transactions to GT; IUJ can not held liability to its
distributor; GT has an incentive to sell IUJ’s product and increase
IUJ’s market share; IUJ does not face any fluctuation in terms of prices
and market conditions. However, IUJ may have disadvantages such as loss
control over prices and distribution situation in Germany, price
reduction to GT, limited understanding of market demand and customers’
preferences. Therefore, IUJ should consider carefully conditions of the
Distributorship Agreement with GT.
In response to the 5
requirements of GT, IUJ should analyze these requirements carefully and
consider counter-solutions. From the point of view
of IUJ’s overseas sales department head, he or she should consider the
analysis below before entering the distributorship agreement with GT:
Type of distributorship: GT wants to become IUJ’s exclusive distributor in Germany. This requirement is reasonable and IUJ should accept because:
1) GT will take all risks and responsibilities to distribute GIZMO within German territory.
2)
This arrangement assure that there will be no competition in this
territory for distributing GIZMO and thus GT has strong motivation to
effectively promote this product and bring IUJ secure financial return.
3)
The excusive distributorship will motivate GT to expand fast the
market for GIZMO by using its nationwide distribution networks and marketing experience. Therefore, IUJ can capture huge market in Germany without any investment in building distribution channel there.
4)
IUJ should appoint only one distributor in one territory and
should not distribute GIZMO to other firms for use or resale. This point
is to avoid conflicts of distribution of GIZMO, secure the rights to
make profits for GT and motivate it to use its best efforts to develop
business in, to promote the sale of, and to sell the product.
However,
IUJ should impose some restrictions on GT such as: not to enter into
any distribution agreements involving competing products; not to sell
GIZMO outside the German territory; not to remove or repack the product
in this territory; follow recommended retailed prices provided by IUJ;
be able to provide sale & customer support and maintain sales staff
to expand the market. These restrictions help IUJ prevent GT from
selling competitive products, marking up prices so high that GIZMO is
much more expensive than competitive products or reducing too much
prices to enter unfair competition, selling outside assigned territory
and being unable to develop marketsmarkets.
Buyer-seller relationship: GT
requests that the seller-buyer relationship should be the relation
between IUJ and GTHK. This relationship might not have any effect on the
distributorship agreement with GT. However, IUJ might face a high financial risk
in selling GIZMO to GTHK since it owns no property and other assets
with substantial value. The other risk is that GTHK can resell GIZMO to
other GT’s group members even though it has no sales to other outside
parties. Therefore, IUJ could accept this requirement when imposing
other conditions: 1) GTHK, under any circumstance, will not be allowed
to resell GIZMO to any other parties; 2) the payment shall be made in
L/C in advance to IUJ’s bank account (to make sure that IUJ receives
payment before producing ordered quantity by GTHK); 3) sales contracts
shall be made under the Japanese commercial law; prices and all other
sales conditions are agreed by IUJ and GT; 4) GTHK shall not be GT’s
representative in working with IUJ. It means that GTHK shall
automatically follow the agreement reached by IUJ and GT and shall not
intervene in any discussion and negotiation between the two parties.
This condition allows IUJ to control over GT in terms of prices and
selling conditions.
Delivery:
GT requests that the delivery should be made directly from IUJ to its
warehouses or retail shops or business customers in accordance with its
designation to be made from time to time. This requirement seems to be
unreasonable and unrealistic because IUJ could not know the specific
locations in Germany designated by GT. If IUJ can know these places, the
delivery costs will be very high as IUJ needs to hire a freight company
to do such specific deliveries and IUJ could not have necessary control
over those deliveries. Under general international trade practices,
international delivery terms are commonly FOB and CIF. Therefore, IUJ
should reject this requirement. Instead, IUJ should propose FOB Tokyo,
and the date of the bill of lading shall be taken to be the date of
delivery of the product. IUJ shall not be liable for delays in delivery
or failure to manufacture due to strikes, lock-outs, riots, civil
commotions, insurrections, wars, acts of God, operation of law or any
other causes beyond its control.
Duration and termination: GT’s request on duration and termination is reasonable and IUJ should accept this proposal because a 5-year agreement and possiblepossible
renewals will build a long term business relationship with GT, generate
its loyalty and devotion to work with IUJ in the long term and motivate
it to become IUJ’s reliable business partner who is willing to
distribute IUJ’s products in Germany. However, IUJ should impose
conditions on the sales performance such as the minimum monthly sales GT
needs to achieve. Otherwise, IUJ shall have right to terminate the
agreement at any time if GT fails to achieve this target.
Non-competition after termination of an agency contract:
Because the case does not provide detailed information about the agency
contract between IUJ and Zeller, I suggest two options:
- First
option: if the agency contract between IUJ and Zeller has already
imposed obligations on non-competition for a certain time after the
termination of the agency contract, GT’s request on prohibition against
Zeller from selling GIZMO is not necessary. In this case, I guess that
the non-competition should includes prohibitions to manufacture products
of the same type as GIZMO; to sell under trade marks and refrain from
altering the products or packaging; to maintain adequate stocks to meet
anticipated demand after termination; to continue to provide after sale
service after the termination; to inform his clients about the
termination and to settle consequences of the termination such as to
clear remained stocks and stop to sell GIZMO right after the
termination. Hence, the request to prohibit Zeller from selling other
similar handled computer games and software in Germany is not reasonable
because Zeller has the rights to re-organize his business and to become
an agent or distributor of other manufacturers after the termination of
agency contract with IUJ. Therefore, IUJ should reject this
requirement.
- Second option: If the agency contract between IUJ and
Zeller has not imposed obligations on non-competition for a certain time
after the termination, a non-competition agreement with Zeller upon the
termination is necessary to avoid potential conflicts of distribution
of GIZMO between GT and Zeller in future. However, it is quite difficult
to persuade Zeller to enter into such agreement as Zeller needs to
re-organize his business after the termination and he has no obligation
to sign such agreement. Thus, IUJ needs to negotiate with Zeller and if
necessary sacrifice by giving him certain compensation or letting him
sell GIZMO in markets outside Germany if possible. In this case, IUJ
only can accept GT’s requirement after successfully signing a
non-competition agreement with Zeller. However, this option is quite
rare because in general every company should have non-competition
clauses in their agency agreements.
Besides, IUJ should impose
obligations on non-competition after the termination of the
distributorship agreement as discussed above. IUJ also should request
other conditions on intellectual property, confidentiality, consequences
of termination, arbitration, notification, legal jurisdiction, currency
& currency fluctuation, competition law and force majeure.
2. Analysis of the relationship between IUJ and Zeller
The
relationship between IUJ and Zeller is the legal relationship between a
principal and an agent engaged in an agency contract. IUJ and Zeller,
through consent, signed a 5-year agency contract in June 2001 in which
Zeller is IUJ’s agent to sell GIZMO product in Germany. Under the agent
agreement, both IUJ and Zeller have legal duties toward each other. For
example, Zeller has the duties to obey instruction from IUJ, to hold
personal liability to IUJ, to act with skill to promote GIZMO in the
German market, to avoid conflicts of interests with IUJ, to protect
confidential information, to notify IUJ all information that may be
useful for IUJ to evaluate the matter at hand, and to account financial
report to IUJ. On the other hand, IUJ has duties toward Zeller such as
to compensate Zeller for his service and effort to sell GIZMO and to
support Zeller in selling GIZMO. However, IUJ is liable for contracts
made by Zeller to the third party as he acts in a fiduciary to IUJ. It
has both directdirect
and indirect liability for the torts caused by Zeller to the third
party and Zeller also has personal liability for any torts he committed.
In case of disclosed principal, Zeller has no personal liability for
contracts made on behalf of IUJ. In partially disclosed principal
situation, Zeller is liable for the contract and IUJ may be liable on
the contract also. But in case of undisclosed principal, IUJ is liable
on the contract.
The agency contract will expire in July 2006.
Due to Zeller’s limited capability to expand the market in Germany, IUJ
want to terminate this contract when it expires. This termination is by
the act of IUJ and legally right. Both IUJ and Zeller have
responsibilities to settle all consequences of termination.
3. Copyrights and the Production and Distribution of Pocket Monster in Germany
According
to the information in the case, Pocket Monster is new software invented
by a copyright holder in which he features the characteristics of a
famous Japanese cartoon. Under the copy right law, he has the rights to
reproduce the original, make derivative versions and distribute copies.
IUJ has had his permissionpermission
to produce and sell it in Japanese language and in Japan. The legal
relationship between him and IUJ is that he grants IUJ the right to
reproduce and distribute those copies of Pocket Monster in Japanese
language and in Japan under a copyright contract or a copyright
agreement. But he does not grant IUJ the right to make derivative
versions such as translated Pocket Monster in German language and to
distribute copies of the original outside Japan.
The copyright
prohibits IUJ from distributing copies of Pocket Monster in markets
outside Japan and making translated versions of this software.
Therefore, to produce Pocket Monster in German version and sell it in
Germany, IUJ needs to enter a new copyright agreement or a new copyright
contract with him in order to have the legal right to do 3 things:
1) produce a derivative software in German version
2) reproduce this derivative software
3) sell it in Germany
Only after having such agreement, can IUJ start to make a German version, produce it and sell it in Germany.
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